Appeal No. 1996-0848
Application 07/624,053
vacuum, but always in light of the prior art and of the particular application disclosure as it
would be interpreted by one possessing the
ordinary level of skill in the pertinent art." In re Moore, 439 F.2d 1232, 1235,
169 USPQ 236, 238 (CCPA 1971). We note that the purpose of the second paragraph of
Section 112 is to basically insure, with a reasonable degree of particularity, an
adequate notification of the metes and bounds of what is being claimed. See In re
Hammock, 427 F.2d 1378, 1382, 166 USPO 204, 208 (CCPA 1970). When viewed in
light of this authority, we do not agree with the examiner that the metes and bounds of the
rejected claims would not be capable of being determined when read in light of the
specification and as one skilled in this art would interpret them. Here, one reading the
claims in light of the specification would readily appreciate that the cells must be contacted
with a mitogen in order to stimulate the production of the factor. However, the failure of the
claims to explicitly state this information does not make the scope of the claims unclear.
We, therefore, reverse the rejection of claims 16-22, 24, 25, 27-32, 34, 35, and 42 under
35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph.
The rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
In rejecting claims 16-22, 24, 25, 27-32, 34, 35, and 42 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) as unpatentable over Jones, the examiner urges (Answer, page 8):
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