Appeal No. 1997-2216
Application No. 08/392,661
"period." As "a pulse" is defined as being for a
predetermined time, the examiner's interpretation renders the
claimed phrase redundant and meaningless. "Since words in
claims are to be interpreted to have meaning," Freeman v.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 693 F. Supp. 134, 9 USPQ2d 1111,
1118 (D. Del. 1988), the examiner's interpretation is
improper. To give meaning to "for a predetermined time," we
must interpret the phrase as meaning that pulses are generated
only for a set amount of time and cease thereafter.
Further, although particular limitations from the
specification will not be read into the claims,(see Loctite
Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 867, 228 USPQ 90, 93
(Fed. Cir. 1985)), it is proper to use the specification to
interpret a word or phrase in the claim. See E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1433,
7 USPQ2d 1129, 1132 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Loctite, 781 F.2d at
867, 228 USPQ at 93. Reading the phrase "one or more pulses,
up to a predetermined finite maximum number of pulses, or for
a predetermined time," in light of the specification, we find
that a reasonable interpretation of this language would be
that the entire period during which pulses are generated is a
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