Appeal No. 1998-1024
Application 08/511,703
Turning to appellants’ arguments on pages 26-31 of the brief, appellants, for the most part,
merely point out differences between the disclosed invention and the teachings of the applied references
individually. However, nonobviousness cannot be established by attacking references individually
when, as here, the rejection is predicated upon a combination of prior art disclosures. See In re Merck
& Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097, 231 USPQ 375, 380 (Fed. Cir. 1986) and In re Young, 403 F.2d 754,
757-58, 159 USPQ 725, 728 (CCPA 1968). Appellants also make much of the fact that Tappet’s
drive motors are hydraulic, implying that drive motors of this type are precluded by the claims.
However, the appealed claims do not preclude hydraulic drive motors. Hence, this argument fails at the
outset because it is predicated on limitations that are not found in the claims. In re Self, 671 F.2d
1344, 1348, 213 USPQ 1, 5 (CCPA 1982).
In the present instance, appellants have not specifically argued the combination of references as
set forth by the examiner in the rejection under section 103. Rather, appellants have merely pointed out
individual deficiencies of the references and argued features of the invention that are not found in the
claims. These arguments are not persuasive of error on the part of the examiner in rejecting the claims
under section 103. Accordingly, we will sustain the examiner’s rejection of claims 1-10 under section
103 as being unpatentable over Tappert in view of Rodi and Mamberer.
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