Appeal No. 1998-2556
Application 08/571,044
Grotz disclosure, we do not sustain the examiner’s
anticipation rejection of claim 1 or of claims 2, 4, 5, 8, 10,
12, 14 and 15 which depend therefrom based on the Grotz
disclosure.
We now consider the various rejections of the claims
under 35 U.S.C. § 103. In rejecting claims under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103, it is incumbent upon the examiner to establish a
factual basis to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.
See In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1073, 5 USPQ2d 1596, 1598 (Fed.
Cir. 1988). In so doing, the examiner is expected to make the
factual determinations set forth in Graham v. John Deere Co.,
383 U.S. 1, 17, 148 USPQ 459, 467 (1966), and to provide a
reason why one having ordinary skill in the pertinent art
would have been led to modify the prior art or to combine
prior art references to arrive at the claimed invention. Such
reason must stem from some teaching, suggestion or implication
in the prior art as a whole or knowledge generally available
to one having ordinary skill in the art. Uniroyal, Inc. v.
Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044, 1051, 5 USPQ2d 1434, 1438
(Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 825 (1988); Ashland Oil,
Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 293,
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