Interference No. 104,241
Benefit of prior applications under 35 U.S.C. § 119 and
35 U.S.C. § 120 for determining what is the effective date of
an application under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) is accorded with
respect to what is claimed by an applicant. That is, under 35
U.S.C. §§ 119 and 120 the question to be resolved is: does an
applicant's disclosure in the specification of the benefit
application relied on satisfy the requirements of 35 U.S.C. §
112, first paragraph, with respect to the full scope of the
subject matter now being claimed by applicant. With respect
to 35 U.S.C. § 119, see In re Gostelli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1010,
1011, 10 USPQ2d 1614 (Fed. Cir. 1989): Kawai v. Metlesics, 480
F.2d 880, 885, 178 USPQ 158, 162 (CCPA 1973). With respect to
35 U.S.C. § 120, see In re Lukach, 442 F.2d 967, 969, 970, 169
USPQ 795, 796 (CCPA 1971); In re Scheiber, 587 F.2d 59, 62,
199 USPQ 782, 784 (CCPA 1978).
We find that Jeon et al. have failed to meet their burden
of persuasion and have failed to prove that they are entitled
to the relief sought by them in their motion. Rather than
prove that the Cupps et al. benefit application does not
describe and enable, in the sense of 35 U.S.C. § 112, at least
one species within the count, Jeon et al. have improperly
focused on whether or not Cupps et al. benefit application
supports, in the sense of 35 U.S.C. § 112, the full scope of
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