reasons that since the board has accepted that Sever conceived
the invention prior to Glickman, then one would necessarily
conclude that Sever’s invention was communicated to Glickman.
Sever’s argument is misplaced. The Order to Show Cause
indicated that for purposes of priority, Sever “has demonstrated
that Sever conceived of the invention sometime prior to
Glickman’s 2 September 1997 filing date” (Paper 2 at 5). That
Sever demonstrated that it conceived the invention prior to the
filing date of the Glickman patent does not mean that Sever is
the first to conceive the invention. Glickman could properly
demonstrate conception prior to Sever’s conception. Logically,
if Sever’s “conception” was sufficient to proceed with the
interference, the Order to Show Cause would not have been made.
Still further, the Order to Show Cause stated that for
purposes of derivation, Sever failed to sufficiently demonstrate
that its conception was prior to its alleged communication date.
Sever provides no explanation in its response to this point
raised in the Order to Show Cause.
Since Sever has failed to sufficiently demonstrate that
Glickman derived the invention from Sever, we conclude that this
interference should not proceed and that entry of summary
judgment against Sever is appropriate. We address, however,
Sever’s additional arguments as follows.
9
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