Appeal No. 1996-0478 Application No. 08/171,769 situation were the result of the appellant’s doing, the judicially created doctrine of double patenting would apply if the application claims were allowed to issue. The ruling in Schneller that double patenting existed was based upon a factual situation which is not present here, from which the court found the inventions not to be independent and distinct. It is our view that Schneller did not establish a rule of general application and thus is limited to the particular set of facts set forth in that decision. In fact, the Court in Schneller, 397 F.2d at 355, 158 USPQ at 215, cautioned against the tendency to freeze into rules of general application what, at best, are statements applicable to particular fact situations. The Federal Circuit cites Schneller in Eli Lilly Co v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., No. 99-1262, - 1263, -1264, -1303, Slip Opinion at 22-24, (Fed. Cir. May 30, 2001). Eli Lilly states: Through a statutorily prescribed term, Congress limits the duration of a patentee's right to exclude others from practicing a claimed invention. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1994). The judicially-created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting cements that legislative limitation by prohibiting a party from obtaining an extension of the right to exclude through claims in a later patent that are not patentably distinct from claims in a commonly owned earlier patent. In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 892, 225 USPQ 645, 648 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (explaining that, even though no explicit statutory basis exists for obviousness-type double patenting, the doctrine is necessary to prevent a patent term extension through claims in a second patent that are not patentably distinct from those in the first patent). As one of our predecessor courts explained, "[t]he fundamental reason for the rule [of obviousness-type double patenting] is to prevent unjustified timewise extension of the right to exclude granted by a patent no matter how the extension is brought about." In re Van Ornum, 686 F.2d 937, 943-44, 214 USPQ 761, 766 (CCPA 1982) (quoting In re Schneller, 397 F.2d 350, 158 USPQ 210, 214 (CCPA 1968)). 6Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 NextLast modified: November 3, 2007