Ex Parte YAMAZAKI - Page 6




                Appeal No. 1996-0478                                                                                                     
                Application No. 08/171,769                                                                                               


                situation were the result of the appellant’s doing, the judicially created doctrine of                                   
                double patenting would apply if the application claims were allowed to issue.  The                                       
                ruling in Schneller that double patenting existed was based upon a factual situation                                     
                which is not present here, from which the court found the inventions not to be                                           
                independent and distinct.  It is our view that Schneller did not establish a rule of                                     
                general application and thus is limited to the particular set of facts set forth in that                                 
                decision.  In fact, the Court in Schneller, 397 F.2d at 355, 158 USPQ at 215, cautioned                                  
                against the tendency to freeze into rules of general application what, at best, are                                      
                statements applicable to particular fact situations.                                                                     
                        The Federal Circuit cites Schneller in Eli Lilly Co v. Barr Laboratories, Inc.,                                  
                No. 99-1262, - 1263, -1264, -1303, Slip Opinion at 22-24, (Fed. Cir.                                                     
                May 30, 2001).  Eli Lilly states:                                                                                        
                                Through a statutorily prescribed term, Congress limits the duration                                      
                        of a patentee's right to exclude others from practicing a claimed invention.                                     
                        35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1994).  The judicially-created doctrine of                                                
                        obviousness-type double patenting cements that legislative limitation by                                         
                        prohibiting a party from obtaining an extension of the right to exclude                                          
                        through claims in a later patent that are not patentably distinct from claims                                    
                        in a commonly owned earlier patent.  In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 892,                                             
                        225 USPQ 645, 648 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (explaining that, even though no                                              
                        explicit statutory basis exists for obviousness-type double patenting, the                                       
                        doctrine is necessary to prevent a patent term extension through claims in                                       
                        a second patent that are not patentably distinct from those in the first                                         
                        patent).   As one of our predecessor courts explained, "[t]he fundamental                                        
                        reason for the rule [of obviousness-type double patenting] is to prevent                                         
                        unjustified timewise extension of the right to exclude granted by a patent                                       
                        no matter how the extension is brought about."  In re Van Ornum,                                                 
                        686 F.2d 937, 943-44, 214 USPQ 761, 766 (CCPA 1982) (quoting In re                                               
                        Schneller, 397 F.2d 350, 158 USPQ 210, 214 (CCPA 1968)).                                                         
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