Appeal No. 1997-4234
Application No. 08/423,211
has some significance in defining that which appellants regard as their invention. Thus,
we would assume that there is a difference in scope between "a substantially sheet-like
structure" as compared to "a sheet-like structure." However, it is not clear from the
disclosure of this application, even read in light of the prior art, how one skilled in this
art would interpret the claim terminology to arrive at a reasonable understanding of the
scope of the present claims. Thus, in our opinion, one skilled in this art attempting to
ascertain that which is encompassed by the claims in which this language appears,
would be left with no guidance from the specification. Further, there is no evidence
presently of record which would reasonably indicate that the cited terminology has an
art recognized meaning.
It is well established that "definiteness of the language employed must be
analyzed, not in a vacuum, but always in light of the prior art and of the particular
application disclosure as it would be interpreted by one possessing the ordinary level of
skill in the pertinent art." In re Moore, 439 F.2d 1232, 1235, 169 USPQ 236, 238
(CCPA 1971). We note that the purpose of the second paragraph of Section 112 is
basically to insure, with a reasonable degree of particularity, an adequate notification of
the metes and bounds of what is being claimed. See In re Hammack, 427 F.2d
1378, 1382, 166 USPO 204, 208 (CCPA 1970). When claims 1-27 and 29 are viewed
in light of this authority, it does not reasonably appear that one skilled in the art would
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