Ex Parte PHILLIPS et al - Page 3



         Appeal No. 1998-1416                                        Page 3          
         Application No. 08/062,736                                                  

         respective positions articulated by appellants and the examiner.            
         We have treated the claims separately to the extent appellants              
         have argued the limitations of each claim separately consistent             
         with 37 CFR § 1.192 (c)(7) and (c)(8) (1997).  In so doing, we              
         find that the examiner’s  102 rejection of claims 20-22 and 27              
                             .  However, we concur with the examiner’s               
         conclusion with respect to claims 18, 19 and 25.  Accordingly, we           
         will sustain the § 102(b) rejection of claims 18, 19 and 25.  Our           
         reasoning follows.                                                          
              Initially we note that anticipation by a prior art reference           
         does not require that reference to recognize either the inventive           
         concept of the claimed subject matter or the inherent properties            
         that may be possessed by the prior art reference.  See Verdegaal            
         Bros. Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 814 F.2d 628, 633, 2 USPQ2d 1051,              
         1054 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 827 (1987).  A prior art           
         reference anticipates the subject matter of a claim when the                
         reference discloses every feature of the claimed invention,                 
         either explicitly or inherently (see Hazani v. Int'l Trade                  










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