Appeal No. 1999-2070
Application 08/611,899
intended such language to represent an additional structural
limitation or mere introductory language.” In re Paulsen, 30
F.3d at 1478-79, 31 USPQ2d at 1673, (Fed. Cir. 1994). If the
body of a claim fully sets forth the complete invention,
including all of its limitations, and the preamble is not
“necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality to the claim”
and moreover, offers no distinct definition of any of the
claimed invention's limitations, but rather merely states the
purpose or intended use of the invention, then the preamble is
of no significance to claim construction because it cannot be
said to constitute or explain a claim limitation. Pitney
Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1305, 51
USPQ2d 1161, 1165-66, (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Upon review of Appellants’ application in entirety, we
find that the preamble of claim 1 which recites, in part, “[a]
voltage limiter” gives “life, meaning, and vitality to the
claim.” Therefore, in order to anticipate claim 1, the prior
art reference of Gray must disclose a device compable of
functioning as a voltage limiter. We find, however, that Gray
discloses a distributed amplifier. A distributed amplifier is
not a type of voltage limiter nor could it ever be construed
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