Appeal No. 1999-2070
Application 08/611,899
as such. Based on this finding, we conclude that Gray does
not anticipate claim 1. Accordingly, we reverse the
Examiner’s rejection of Claim 1 as anticipated by Gray.
The preamble of independent claim 15 similarly recites in
part “[A] voltage limiter. . . .” Because Gray does not teach
a “voltage limiter”, we find that Gray does not anticipate
independent claim 15. Accordingly, we also reverse the
Examiner’s rejection of Claim 15 as anticipated by Gray. The
dependent claims included under the umbrella of the 35 U.S.C.
§ 102 rejections all require the limitation of a “voltage
limiter”. Accordingly, we likewise reverse the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 2, 3, 5, 10-12, 16, and 20 as anticipated
by Gray.
We now address the 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejections.
In rejecting claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103, the Examiner
bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of
obviousness. In re Attacher, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445, 24 USPQ
1443, 1444 (Fed Cir. 1992). See also In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d
1468, 1472, 223 USPQ 785, 788 (Fed Cir. 1984). The Examiner
can satisfy this burden by showing that some objective
teaching in the prior art or knowledge generally available to
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