Interference No. 103,891
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing Davis v. Loesch, 998 F.2d 963, 967, 27
USPQ2d 1440, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). The established standard of
count interpretation is that interference counts are to be given
the broadest interpretation which they will reasonably support.
Mead v. McKirnan, 585 F.2d 504, 507, 199 USPQ 513, 515-16 (CCPA
1978). Terms in the count are to be given their ordinary and
accustomed meaning. See Johnson Worldwide Assocs. Inc. v. Zebco
Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 990, 50 USPQ2d 1607, 1610 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(quoting Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa Per Azioni , 158 F.3d
1243, 1249, 48 USPQ2d 1117, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1998)) . Resort to a
specification from which a claim on which the count is based or
resort to extrinsic evidence is only appropriate or necessary
when an ambiguity exists in the count. If an ambiguity is found,
resort may be had to the specification of the patent from which
the claims originate to resolve the ambiguity. See In re Spina,
975 F.2d 854, 856, 24 USPQ2d 1142, 1144 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Determination of the existence of an ambiguity requires consider-
ation of both the language of the count and the reasonableness
of the arguments indicating the count has different meanings.
Kroekel v. Shah, 558 F.2d 29, 31-32, 194 USPQ 544, 546 (CCPA
1977). The mere fact that the parties ascribe different meanings
to a count or that the count is readable on more than one embodi-
22
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