Interference No. 103,987
delay reasonable, based on the time it takes the courts and
the bar to recognize and act on the change?
In support of this proposition Lim cites Anderson v.
Natta, 480 F.2d 1392, 178 USPQ 458 (CCPA 1973), a case in
which
the CCPA determined that it was unreasonable for the Board of
Interferences to refuse to consider an argument raised at
final hearing that was not earlier raised by a motion.
Between the motion period and the decision, the Supreme Court
had decided Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 148 USPQ 689
(1966). In its comment on the Board’s opinion, the Court
stated:
We think it sufficient to recognize that at
the very least the Manson opinion was an
important clarification of the law of
utility which brought into focus particular
considerations regarded by the Supreme
Court as of paramount importance in
ascertaining utility within the meaning of
the statute. The decision of the Supreme
Court in Manson was, in our opinion, good
reason to excuse the failure of Natta to
present a motion during the motion period.
While the board correctly observed that
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