Interference No. 103,987 enough time to digest and act on the Gentry decision in this less than six month period. Based on this fact, we hold that the reasonable amount of time to be excused based on the novelty of the Gentry opinion is approximately the time necessary for the district courts to start to use the Gentry case in decisions or just after the first district court case appeared relying on the Gentry holding. Therefore, the maximum amount of time creditable to Lim based on the perceived change in law is approximately six months. This amount of time is far short of the time that must be excused for Lim’s motion under 37 CFR § 1.645 to prevail. Therefore,6 Lim’s miscellaneous motion under 37 CFR § 1.645 for 6 The amount of time excused is so much shorter than the time it actually took junior party Lim’s counsel to file the motion, we must, under our precedent, presume the additional delay was the result of a change in strategy, opinion, or purpose, which does not constitute good cause for excusing the belatedness of a motion. See 2 Rivise and Caesar, Interference Law and Practice, Section 270, The Michie Co. 1943; Suh v. Hoefle, 23 USPQ2d 1321 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1991). 10Page: Previous 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 NextLast modified: November 3, 2007