Interference No. 104,290
As an initial matter, we note that an argument of
Edwards raises an issue of count construction. See EB10-11. The
proper interpretation of a count is a question of law. Credle v.
Bond, 25 F.3d 1566, 1571, 30 USPQ2d 1911, 1915 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(citing Davis v. Loesch, 998 F.2d 963, 967, 27 USPQ2d 1440, 1444
(Fed. Cir. 1993)). The established standard of count interpreta
tion is that interference counts are to be given the broadest
interpretation which they will reasonably support. Mead v.
McKirnan, 585 F.2d 504, 507, 199 USPQ 513, 515-16 (CCPA 1978).
Resort to a specification from which a claim on which the count
is based or resort to extrinsic evidence is only appropriate or
necessary when an ambiguity exists in the count. If an ambiguity
is found, resort may be had to the specification of the patent
from which the claims originate to resolve the ambiguity. See
In re Spina, 975 F.2d 854, 856, 24 USPQ2d 1142, 1144 (Fed. Cir.
1992). Determination of the existence of an ambiguity requires
consideration of both the language of the count and the reason
ableness of the arguments indicating the count has different
meanings. Kroekel v. Shah, 558 F.2d 29, 31-32, 194 USPQ 544, 546
(CCPA 1977). The mere fact that the parties ascribe different
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