BUCHWALD et al v. COLLINS et al v. DRUMM et al v. IANNUZZI et al v. KEREM et al v. RIORDAN et al v. ROMMENS et al v. TSUI - Page 18




                  Interference Nos. 103,882, 103,933, and 104,228                                          Consolidated Judgment                          
                  Gregory v. Tsui et al.                                                                                      Page 18                     
                           Tsui argues that policy militates for a practice that enforces complete disclosure in the                                      
                  earliest accorded benefit application.  Tsui advances two principal reasons for its position.  The                                      
                  first, that it is the policy of the agency to discourage misconduct and to ensure the issuance of                                       
                  valid patents, is not persuasive.  The argument is directed to claims and not to the relevant count.                                    
                  To the extent a problem really exists, it can be resolved in further prosecution.  Had Tsui really                                      
                  felt such scruples about being a private attorney general with regard to Gregory's alleged best-                                        
                  mode violation, it could have filed a timely motion.  It did not.  The second argument, invoking                                        
                  In re Costello, 717 F.2d 1346, 219 USPQ 389 (Fed. Cir. 1983), requires further discussion.                                              
                           Section 102(g) requires not only priority of invention, but also that the earlier inventor                                     
                  "had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed" the invention.  In Costello, the applicant had                                            
                  literally abandoned its earliest application and was now trying to overcome a rejection under                                           
                  35 U.S.C. 102(e).  Since Costello involves rejection of a claim and a lack of copendency under                                          
                  35 U.S.C. 120, it is not really on point.  Nevertheless, the court in Costello pointed to an earlier                                    
                  interference decision for the proposition that an abandoned application can only serve as                                               
                  evidence of conception, not as a constructive reduction to practice.  717 F.2d at 1350 n.13 & text,                                     
                  219 USPQ at 391 n.13 & text, citing Carty v. Kellogg, 7 App. D.C. 542, 1896 Comm'r Dec. 188                                             
                  (1896).  Carty relies on an interference decision, Hien v. Pungs, 1894 Comm'r Dec. 92, 95, which                                        
                  in turn traces the rule to two earlier interference decisions, Beach v. Fowler, 1889 Comm'r Dec.                                        
                  187, and Webster v. Sanford, 1888 Comm'r Dec. 92, both of which deal with abandonment of an                                             
                  application in the absence of any actual reduction to practice.  Cf. Correge v. Murphy, 705 F.2d                                        
                  1326, 1330, 217 USPQ 753, 756 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (explaining that failure to make the invention                                           







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