Ex Parte MOTOYAMA - Page 6




             Appeal No. 2002-0867                                                                              
             Application No. 08/738,659                                                                        

                   New Ground of Rejection -- 37 CFR § 1.196(b)                                                
                   We enter the following new ground of rejection against the claims in accordance             
             with 37 CFR § 1.196(b): Claims 10, 16, 36, 42, 74, 78, 82, and 86 are rejected under 35           
             U.S.C. § 102(e)(2) as being anticipated by Kraslavsky.                                            
                   Independent claims 10, 16, 36, and 42 recite transmitting information through               
             “electronic mail.”  The instant specification does not set forth any particular definition for    
             the term.  We are thus faced with the problem of determining the metes and bounds of              
             the recitation; a problem that we addressed in a decision in an earlier appeal in a               
             related application.  In particular, in that application (S.N. 08/738,461; Appeal No. 1999-       
             2767), we determined that the term is broad in scope.  We reproduce below the                     
             pertinent section from the earlier decision, which applied the claimed “electronic mail           
             message” to the Kraslavsky reference.                                                             
                          A section 103 analysis begins with a key legal question -- what is the               
                   invention claimed?  Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561,                      
                   1567, 1 USPQ2d 1593, 1597 (Fed. Cir. 1987).  At the oral hearing,                           
                   appellant’s counsel confirmed that Kraslavsky discloses a process that                      
                   meets all requirements of instant claim 88, with one  exception argued by                   
                   appellant -- although the reference discloses receiving and analyzing                       
                   electronic messages, the messages are not deemed to be electronic “mail”                    
                   messages.  Determining the metes and bounds of the recitation “electronic                   
                   mail message” is thus a material inquiry in proper interpretation of claim 88.              
                          Counsel for appellant conceded that the instant specification does                   
                   not provide a definition for the relevant term.  However, counsel submitted                 
                   that the term is well-known in the art, and that a formal definition may be                 
                   found by reference to technical dictionaries.                                               
                          The McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Scientific and Technical Terms, (5th                   
                   ed. 1994), at page 663, defines electronic mail as “[t]he electronic                        
                   transmission of letters, messages, and memos through a communications                       
                   network.”  The New IEEE Standard Dictionary of Electrical and Electronics                   
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