Appeal No. 2004-0721 Application No. 09/401,409 consequence of yielding to these arguments would be to read a limitation of the specification into these claims. We reach this determination for a number of reasons. First, there is a heavy presumption that a claim term carries its ordinary and customary meaning. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Inc., 314 F.3d at 1327, 65 USPQ2d at 1394. As previously indicated, the appellants at least implicitly have conceded that the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim term “on” encompasses the interpretation urged by the examiner whereby the here claimed depositing step may be regarded as encompassing Xu’s step of depositing an oxide indirectly on a low-k dielectric material. Though such a claim interpretation is broad, it is not unreasonable or inconsistent with the appellants’ specification since the specification contains no restricted definition of the term “on” which would require the more narrow claim construction asserted by the appellants. See In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d at 1372-73, 54 USPQ2d at 1668. In addition, it is significant that the subject specification disclosure does not in any way exclude an embodiment in accordance with the examiner’s claim interpretation wherein the appellants’ oxide is deposited indirectly on the low- k dielectric material. For example, the etch-back and other 6Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 NextLast modified: November 3, 2007