Ex Parte Turner et al - Page 25


              Appeal No. 2004-1040                                                        Page 25                        
              Application No. 09/770,643                                                                                 

                     The practical effect of Appellants’ utility standard, however, would be that making                 
              a microarray with 1000 genes represented on it would require investigating each of the                     
              DNA sequences (and subsequences) on the gene chip to ensure that it was not the                            
              subject of someone else’s patent.  For each of the DNAs that was the subject of                            
              someone else’s patent claim, a license would have to be negotiated – potentially                           
              thousands of such negotiations for the finished product.  These transaction costs would                    
              have to be incurred for each new product that an aspiring gene chip manufacturer                           
              wished to market.  The industry gridlock likely to result has been termed a “tragedy of                    
              the anticommons”:                                                                                          
                     By conferring monopolies in discoveries, patents necessarily increase                               
                     prices and restrict use—a cost society pays to motivate invention and                               
                     disclosure.  The tragedy of the anticommons refers to the more complex                              
                     obstacles that arise when a user needs access to multiple patented inputs                           
                     to create a single useful product.  Each upstream patent allows its owner                           
                     to set up another tollbooth on the road to product development, adding to                           
                     the cost and slowing the pace of downstream biomedical innovation.                                  
              Heller, page 698.7                                                                                         
                     The Supreme Court has warned against allowing too many “tollbooths” on                              
              the road to innovation:                                                                                    
                     Patents . . . are meant to encourage invention by rewarding the inventor                            
                     with the right, limited to a term of years fixed by the patent, to exclude                          
                     others from the use of his invention. . . . But in rewarding useful invention,                      
                     the “rights and welfare of the community must be fairly dealt with and                              
                     effectually guarded.”  Kendall v. Winsor, 21 How. 322, 329 (1859). . . .  To                        
                     begin with, a genuine “invention” or “discovery” must be demonstrated                               
                     “lest in the constant demand for new appliances the heavy hand of tribute                           
                     be laid on each slight technological advance in an art.”                                            
              Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230, 140 USPQ 524, 527 (1964).                          








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