Appeal No. 2004-0636
Application No. 09/045,041
is unclear how the circuit can by compressed by integrating the
partial circuits. As we are unable to determine the metes and
bounds of the claims, we would have to resort to speculation and
assumptions to apply prior art to the above-noted limitations of
the claims. See In re Steele, 305 F.2d 859, 862-63, 134 USPQ
292, 295 (CCPA 1962). Therefore, we cannot sustain the
anticipation rejection of claims 9 through 12, 14 through 18, 20
through 24, 26 through 30, 32 through 36, and 38 through 42, and
44 over Chakrabarti.
Under the provisions of 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b), we enter the
following new ground of rejection against appellant’s claims 9
through 12, 14 through 18, 20 through 24, 26 through 30, 32
through 36, and 38 through 42, and 44. Claims 9 through 12, 14
through 18, 20 through 24, 26 through 30, 32 through 36, and 38
through 42, and 44 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second
paragraph, as being vague and indefinite substantially for the
reasons explained supra.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the examiner rejecting claims 9 through 12,
14 through 18, 20 through 24, 26 through 30, 32 through 36, and
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