Appeal No. 2005-0347 Page 6
Application No. 09/993,335
I. Whether the Rejection of Claims 2-3, 6-7, 26-27, and 30-31 Under
35 U.S.C. § 102 is proper?
It is our view, after consideration of the record before us, that the
disclosure of Kurby does not fully meet the invention as recited in claims 2-3, 6-7,
26-27, and 30-31. Accordingly, we reverse.
It is axiomatic that anticipation of a claim under § 102 can be found only if
the prior art reference discloses every element of the claim. See In re King,
801 F.2d 1324, 1326, 231 USPQ 136, 138 (Fed. Cir. 1986) and Lindemann
Maschinenfabrik GMBH v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 1452,
1458, 221 USPQ 481, 485 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
With respect to independent claim 2, at page 7 of the brief, Appellant cites
to Kurby at column 5, lines 33-37, and argues “Kurby fails to teach or suggest
using the absolute device time transmitted by the satellites to process satellite
trajectory data.” We find this argument unpersuasive. We agree that column 5,
lines 33-37, of Kurby do not teach the claimed processing of satellite trajectory
data. However, lines 38-41 of column 5 refer to determining location by the
“techniques used in the GPS system” and column 3, lines 52-54, teaches that the
GPS system location determining techniques process time data “to triangulate
the position thereof.” Thus, we find that Kurby teaches processing satellite
trajectory data.
Appellant also argues at page 2 of the reply brief that there is no teaching
in Kurby of “using a time synchronization signal from a cellular network.” This
argument goes unchallenged by the Examiner. We have reviewed the Kurby
patent and we find Appellant’s argument persuasive. We find no time
synchronization signal from a cellular network. Rather, Kurby’s time
synchronization signal comes from the satellite 208 as part of data signal 210.
Therefore, we will not sustain the Examiner’s rejection under
35 U.S.C. § 102.
II. Whether the Rejection of Claims 2-3, 6, 26-27, and 30 Under
35 U.S.C. § 102 is proper?
It is our view, after consideration of the record before us, that the
disclosure of Krasner does not fully meet the invention as recited in claims 2-3, 6,
26-27, and 30. Accordingly, we reverse.
With respect to independent claim 2, Appellant argues at pages 11-13 of
the brief that Krasner fails to teach “using a front end only capable of receiving
signals” as recited in claim 2. The Examiner responds in the answer at page 6,
“there is nothing in the method of operation of Krasner . . . that requires or uses
the transmitting portion of the cellular telephone.”
We find the Examiner’s position unpersuasive. While it might be argued
that it is obvious in the extreme to remove the transmitting portion of Krasner’s
cellular telephone and its corresponding functions, we find that doing so is not
taught in Krasner as required by 35 U.S.C. § 102. We find that the Examiner has
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