Appeal No. 2005-0537 Application No. 08/925,985 Page 5 As the court stated in In re Moore, 439 F.2d 1232, 1235, 169 USPQ 236, 238 (CCPA 1971), the determination of whether the claims of an application satisfy the requirements of the second paragraph of Section 112 is merely to determine whether the claims do, in fact, set out and circumscribe a particular area with a reasonable degree of precision and particularity. It is here where the definiteness of language employed must be analyzed -- not in a vacuum, but always in light of the teachings of the prior art and of the particular application disclosure as it would be interpreted by one possessing the ordinary level of skill in the pertinent art. [Footnote omitted.] In order to satisfy the requirements of the second paragraph of § 112, a claim must accurately define the invention in the technical sense. See In re Knowlton, 481 F.2d 1357, 1366, 178 USPQ 486, 492-93 (CCPA 1973). Applying these principles to the present case, we agree with the examiner that the “pure” and “substantially pure” language as used in the appealed claims introduces uncertainty and inconsistency which would preclude one skilled in the art from determining the metes and bounds of the claimed subject matter. With respect to the rejection under the second paragraph of § 112, appellants furnish three groups of claims and state that the appealed claims of each such group stand or fall togetherPage: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 NextLast modified: November 3, 2007