Appeal No. 2005-2489
Application No. 09/949,736
We begin with the claim language. Gechter v. Davidson,
116 F.3d 1454, 1457, 43 USPQ2d 1030, 1032 (Fed. Cir.
1997); In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1479, 31 USPQ2d 1671, 1674
(Fed. Cir. 1994). Generally, we interpret the claims on appeal
by giving words therein the broadest reasonable meanings in their
ordinary usage, taking into account the written description in
the appellant’s specification. See, e.g., In re Morris, 127 F.3d
1048, 1054-55, 44 USPQ2d 1023, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re
Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571, 222 USPQ 934, 936 (Fed. Cir.
1984). When the words in the claim are written in “means-plus-
function” formats, however, we interpret them as being limited to
the corresponding structures described in the specification and
the equivalents thereof in accordance with the requirements of
35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6. In re Donaldson, 16 F.3d 1189,
1193, 29 USPQ2d 1845, 1848 (Fed. Cir. 1994)(in banc). The manner
in which a “means-plus-function” element is expressed, either by
a function followed by the term “means” or by the term “means
for” followed by a function, is unimportant so long as the
modifier of that term specifies a function to be performed.
Ex part Klumb, 159 USPQ 694, 695 (Bd. App. 1967). The use of the
term “means” in the claim raises a presumption that the means-
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