Ex Parte TREMBLAY et al - Page 6




              Appeal No. 2005-2557                                                                       6                                      
              Application No. 09/204,585                                                                                                        
              The examiner responds that the “thrust of the instant invention” is the same as the                                               
              teaching of Yung and that Luan teaches programmable partitioning [answer, pages 11-                                               
              13].  Appellants respond that similarity in “thrust” of the claimed invention and the prior                                       
              art plays no role in the proper legal analysis of obviousness.  Appellants also respond                                           
              that the examiner’s analysis is incorrect and that the memory banks of Luan cannot                                                
              correspond to the structures recited in the claimed invention [reply brief, pages 7-8].                                           
              We will not sustain the examiner’s rejection of claims 1-7, 9-14 and 23-27 for                                                    
              essentially the reasons argued by appellants in the briefs.  We agree with appellants                                             
              that there is no motivation to apply the general programmable memory configurations of                                            
              Luan to the local and global buffers of Yung.  There is no suggestion that programmable                                           
              memory partitioning, as generally taught by Luan, can be applied to                                                               
              register file segments related to global and local registers in a device as taught by Yung.                                       
              We also agree with appellants that the examiner cannot rely on the fact that the applied                                          
              prior art may be the same as or similar to the “thrust” of the claimed invention.  Since                                          
              separately argued claims 8 and 28 depend from claims 7 and 27, respectively, we also                                              
              do not sustain the examiner’s rejection of these claims.                                                                          
                     We now consider the examiner’s rejection of the claims based on Yung, Luan                                                 
              and Nishimoto.  These claims all have recitations similar to the claims considered                                                
              above.  Since Nishimoto does not overcome the deficiencies of Yung and Luan                                                       
              discussed above, we also do not sustain the examiner’s rejection of claims 2 and 15-22                                            
              for the reasons discussed above.                                                                                                  

















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