Appeal No. 2006-0823 Παγε 5
Application No. 10/284,474
merely to determine whether the claims do, in fact, set
out and circumscribe a particular area with a
reasonable degree of precision and particularity. It
is here where the definiteness of language employed
must be analyzed -- not in a vacuum, but always in
light of the teachings of the prior art and of the
particular application disclosure as it would be
interpreted by one possessing the ordinary level of
skill in the pertinent art. [Footnote omitted.]
In order to satisfy the requirements of the second paragraph
of § 112, a claim must accurately define the invention in the
technical sense. See In re Knowlton, 481 F.2d 1357, 1366,
178 USPQ 486, 492-93 (CCPA 1973).
As further explained by our reviewing court in Allen Eng’s
Corp. v. Bartell Indus. Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1348, 63 USPQ 2d
1769, 1775 (Fed. Cir. 2002), the second paragraph of Section 112
requires that (1) the claims on appeal “particularly point out
and distinctly claim an invention” and (2) the claims on appeal
set forth what “the applicant regards as his invention.” The
former requires the claims on appeal to be definite while the
latter requires the claims on appeal to recite the appellants’
invention. Allen Eng’s Corp. v. Bartell Indus. Inc., 299 F.3d at
1348-49, 63 USPQ2d at 1775-76.
Although no limitation in the specification is normally
imputed to the claims being interpreted, see In re Paulsen, 30
F.3d at 1480, 31 USPQ2d at 1674, the specification can still be
used to impart the meaning of words in the claims, see In re
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