Appeal No. 2006-1156
Application No. 09/903,882
Turning to independent claim 12, we will also sustain the rejection of this claim under 35
U.S.C. § 103 as the arguments are similar to those addressed supra with regard to claims 1-3. In
addition, appellant again argues that Armstrong teaches that duplicate addresses are detected by
comparison to existing addresses stored in the memory of a host computer rather than
determining whether more than one response is received to query as to whether devices have a
specified address, as recited in claim 12. We do not find a comparison technique and a
determination of whether one or more responses is received to query as to whether devices have
a specified address to be mutually exclusive.
For the reasons set forth by the examiner, regarding claims 1-3, we will also sustain the
rejection of claim 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
Since appellant’s arguments regarding claim 13 appear to be identical to previous
arguments, for the reasons supra, we will also sustain the rejection of claim 13 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103.
The rejection of claims 4 and 14-16 depends on the Winder reference in addition to the
Kowalski and Armstrong references.
With regard to claims 4 and 14 the examiner relied on Winder’s teaching of an audible or
visual output from a receiver tag when activated for the claimed sensory output of a device that
identifies itself to an operator. Appellant merely incorporates the same arguments as before in
the argument regarding these claims (see page 31 of the principal brief). Accordingly, we will
sustain the rejection of claims 4 and 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
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