Appeal No. 2006-1957
Application No. 10/301,394
heads CH1-CH4 perform at a different “node level” than the network nodes 22 but,
nonetheless, remain a part of the first tier-network, the first-tier network has a plurality of
nodes arranged at different node levels as claimed.
In view of the above discussion and analysis of the disclosure of the Haas
reference, it is our opinion that, although we found no error in the Examiner’s proposed
combination of Li and Haas as discussed supra, the Li reference is not necessary for a
proper rejection of claims 1 and 36 since all of the claimed elements are in fact present
in the disclosure of Haas. A disclosure that anticipates under 35 U.S.C. § 102 also
renders the claim unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103, for "anticipation is the epitome of
obviousness." Jones v. Hardy, 727 F.2d 1524, 1529, 220 USPQ 1021, 1025 (Fed. Cir.
1984). See also In re Fracalossi, 681 F.2d 792, 794, 215 USPQ 569, 571 (CCPA
1982); In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1402, 181 USPQ 641, 644 (CCPA 1974).
For the above reasons, since it is our opinion that the Examiner’s prima facie
case of obviousness has not been overcome by any convincing arguments from
Appellants, the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of independent claims 1 and 36,
as well as dependent claims 2-14, 17-24, 26-31, 35, 37, and 42-49 not separately
argued by Appellants, is sustained.
We also sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of dependent claims
15, 16, 25, 32-34, 38-41, and 50 in which the Sherman, Seazholtz, van Bokhorst, and
Krishnamurthy references are separately applied to the combination of Li and Haas.
Although grouped separately by Appellants, the arguments in the Briefs are limited to a
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