Ex Parte Ingvarsson et al - Page 6



             Appeal No. 2006-2982                                                            Page 6               
             Application No. 10/458,112                                                                           

             claim.  Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242 F.3d 1376, 1383, 58                            

             USPQ2d 1286, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation                             

             v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1576, 18 USPQ2d 1001, 1010 (Fed. Cir.                             

             1991).  Anticipation of a patent claim requires a finding that the claim at                          

             issue “reads on” a prior art reference. Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco, Inc., 190                         

             F.3d 1342, 1346, 51 USPQ2d 1943, 1945 (Fed Cir. 1999) (“In other words, if                           

             granting patent protection on the disputed claim would allow the patentee to                         

             exclude the public from practicing the prior art, then that claim is                                 

             anticipated, regardless of whether it also covers subject matter not in the                          

             prior art.”) (internal citations omitted).                                                           

                                    Claims 1-4, 8, 9 and 11-17 (Rizzo)                                            

             I(a).  We consider first the examiner’s rejection of claims 1-4, 8, 9 and 11-                        

             17 as being anticipated by Rizzo.  We separately address claims 29 and 30                            

             as being anticipated by Rizzo infra.  Since Appellants’ arguments with                               

             respect to this rejection have treated these claims as a single group which                          

             stand or fall together, we will consider independent claim 1 as the                                  

             representative claim for this rejection. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.37(c)(1)(vii)(2004).                      

                    Appellants argue that Rizzo does not teach nor suggest a                                      

             superparamagnetic “nanoparticle” as defined in the instant invention [brief,                         

             page 4].  Appellants argue that the instant specification (at page 10, lines                         

             21-22) defines a nanoparticle as a particle having a diameter of between                             







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