Appeal 2006-3206
Application 09/550,276
this art. See In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054-55, 44 USPQ2d 1023, 1027
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (A[T]he PTO applies to the verbiage of the proposed claims
the broadest reasonable meaning of the words in their ordinary usage as they
would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, taking into account
whatever enlightenment by way of definitions or otherwise that may be
afforded by the written description contained in the applicant=s
specification.@); In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1192-95,
29 USPQ2d 1845, 1848-50 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (in banc) (A[T]he >broadest
reasonable interpretation= that an examiner may give means-plus-function
language is that statutorily mandated in [35 U.S.C. ' 112,] paragraph six.”);
In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321-22, 13 USPQ2d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(ADuring patent examination the pending claims must be interpreted as
broadly as their terms reasonably allow. When the applicant states the
meaning that the claim terms are intended to have, the claims are examined
with that meaning, in order to achieve a complete exploration of the
applicant=s invention and its relation to the prior art. See In re Prater,
415 F.2d 1393, 1404-05, 162 USPQ 541, 550-51 (CCPA 1969).@).
In view of the “means” recitations which specify the function but do
not define structure which satisfies that function in the appealed claims, the
strictures of 35 U. S. C. § 112, sixth paragraph, apply. See Texas Digital
Systems, Inc. v. Telegenx, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1208, 64 USPQ2d 1812,
1822-23 (Fed. Cir 2002), and cases cited therein. Therefore, all of the
“means” language in the appealed claims must be construed as limited to the
“corresponding structure” disclosed in the written description in the
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