Appeal 2006-1601
Application 09/828,579
Also, as already discussed in Section IV.A.(7), our review of the claims
finds they produce an “agreement” by the parties. To reiterate, Appellant’s
Specification at page 4, lines 11-15, states “[w]hile the invention will be described
in connection with these drawings, there is no intent to limit it to the embodiment
or embodiments disclosed therein” and “[o]n the contrary, the intent is to cover all
alternatives, modifications, and equivalents included within the spirit and scope of
the invention as defined by the appended claims.” See also Section IV.A.(7)(a).
Since the language of claim 6 does not preclude implementing by mere
“agreement,” then based on Appellant’s statements we must conclude that claim 6
is intended to include implementing by mere “agreement” as the result of the
claimed process.
We see the question before us to be, whether an agreement by the parties, is
a useful, tangible, and concrete result? As discussed supra, the Federal Circuit
regards the transformation of intangible subject matter to be such a useful,
tangible, and concrete result, so long as data or signals represent some real world
activity. However, we do not find data or signals in claim 6 which represent a real
world activity such as found in Arrhythmia, Alappat, or State Street.
Therefore, we conclude that Appellant’s claims 6-10, which produce an
agreement by the parties, fail to apply their abstract ideas to produce a useful and
concrete and tangible result. Thus claims 6-10 fall outside the scope of § 101.
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