Ex Parte Jakobsson - Page 12

              Appeal 2006-2107                                                                     
              Application 09/969,833                                                               
              the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not include               
              particular machines.”).1                                                             
                    The Supreme Court, however, presumably concerned about barring                 
              patents for future, unforeseeable technologies, declined to rule on whether          
              its precedent foreclosed any other possible avenues for a method claim to            
              qualify as a section 101 process:  “It is argued that a process patent must          
              either be tied to a particular machine or apparatus or must operate to change        
              articles or materials to a ‘different state or thing.’  We do not hold that no       
              process patent could ever qualify if it did not meet the requirements of our         
              prior precedents.”  Benson, 409 U.S. at 71, 175 USPQ 676.  Rather than rule          
              on this question in Benson and Flook, the Supreme Court decided those                
              cases based on the abstract idea exception to patentability.  Benson, 409 U.S.       
              at 71-72, 175 USPQ at 676-77; Flook, 437 U.S. at 594-95, 198 USPQ at                 
              199-200.                                                                             
                    Since Diehr, the Federal Circuit has reviewed several computer                 
              technology cases, and in acknowledgment of the innovations occurring in              
              this technological field, identified a third category of method claims that          
              qualify as a “process.”  Extrapolating from the Supreme Court’s                      
              “transformation and reduction of an article” test, the Federal Circuit has held      

                                                                                                  
              1 The principal exception to this rule, as explained infra, is when the              
              machine-implemented method merely manipulates abstractions.  See                     
              Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72, 175 USPQ at 676-77.  In addition, merely                  
              attaching a machine to an otherwise ineligible method may not be sufficient          
              and would depend on how the machine actually implemented the recited                 
              steps.  For example, if a nonstatutory claim were amended so that a recited          
              step of registering a customer was performed by entering data into a                 
              computer rather than using a sign-up sheet, it is hard to imagine how that           
              alone would satisfy the requirements of § 101 and convert an otherwise               
              ineligible claim into an eligible one.                                               
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