Ex Parte Jakobsson - Page 15

              Appeal 2006-2107                                                                     
              Application 09/969,833                                                               
              customers and Meyer involved a ‘system’ for aiding a neurologist in                  
              diagnosing patients.  Clearly, neither of the alleged ‘inventions’ in those          
              cases falls within any § 101 category.”).2                                           
                    In Schrader, the court affirmed the 101 rejection of a method of               
              competitively bidding on a plurality of related items, relying in part on the        
              Freeman-Walter-Abele (“FWA”) test.  However, consistent with                         
              Arrhythmia, Alappat, State Street, and AT&T, the court also inquired into            
              whether Schrader’s non-machine implemented method claim performed any                
              kind of transformation.  Schrader, 22 F.3d at 294, 30 USPQ2d at 1458 (“we            
              do not find in the claim any kind of data transformation.”).  The court then         
              distinguished Schrader’s claim from the statutorily eligible claims in               
              Arrhythmia, In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 214 USPQ 682 (CCPA 1982), and In              
              re Taner, 681 F.2d 787, 214 USPQ 678 (CCPA 1982), pointing out that in               
              these cases, “[t]hese claims all involved the transformation or conversion of        
              subject matter representative of or constituting physical activity or objects.       
              Id. (emphasis in original).  Schrader expressly concludes that “a process            
              claim [in] compliance with Section 101 requires some kind of                         
              transformation or reduction of subject matter.”3  Id. at 295, 30 USPQ2d at           
                                                                                                  
              2 But see State Street, 149 F.3d at 1376 n.14, 47 USPQ2d at 1603 n.14                
              (observing that “[Maucorp and Meyer] were subject to the Benson era                  
              Freeman-Walter-Abele test – in other words, analysis as it existed before            
              Diehr and Alappat,” without addressing the fact that it was the Alappat              
              decision itself that made the observation that these inventions were “clearly”       
              nonstatutory).                                                                       
              3 Although the FWA test is no longer considered particularly probative               
              in the context of computer-implemented process inventions in view of Diehr           
              (see, e.g., State Street, 149 F.3d at 1374, 47 USPQ2d at 1601), the erosion of       
              FWA provides no support for the position that a non-machine implemented              
              process, not involving any transformation, might be patentable.  The answer          
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