Ex Parte Guler et al - Page 4

                  Appeal 2006-3156                                                                                            
                  Application 09/904,311                                                                                      

                                                          OPINION                                                             
                         We find that Bansal discloses (para. 0131) that an online intermediary                               
                  stores information such as data on buyers and sellers and "data for determining                             
                  the effects of uncertainties and risks of various kinds."  Bansal further discloses                         
                  (para. 0143) that buyers and sellers sometimes wish to take risky positions in                              
                  the market.  The various positions represent buyers' and sellers' attitudes                                 
                  towards risk, or risk attitudes.  Bansal states (para. 0167) that the description                           
                  applies to sealed bid auctions, which Appellants disclose (Specification, p. 4)                             
                  are utility-dependent auctions.  Thus, we find that Bansal teaches determining                              
                  risk attitudes from bids submitted in utility-dependent auctions, as recited in                             
                  independent claims 22 and 39.  Arguably Bansal likewise discloses                                           
                  determining private information, as Bansal teaches storing data on buyers and                               
                  sellers.  However, the information stored is derived from the same auctions as                              
                  the risk attitudes, and, therefore, from utility-dependent auctions rather than                             
                  from utility-independent auctions.                                                                          
                         We find that Hogg discloses (para. 0005) storing and analyzing bid                                   
                  information in an auction.  More particularly, Hogg teaches (para. 0022)                                    
                  processing the highest bids or amounts that bidders are willing to pay for a                                
                  specific item.  We find no suggestion in Hogg (para. 24 or anywhere else) to                                
                  include in Bansal's method a step of determining a bidder's private information                             
                  submitted in a utility-independent auction, as recited in claims 22 and 39.                                 
                  Thus, the Examiner has failed to establish a prima facie case of obviousness for                            
                  claims 22 and 39.   Each of claims 26, 34, and 42 requires determining both                                 
                  risk attitudes from utility-dependent auction bids and also private information                             
                  from utility-independent auction bids, either as steps performed by a processor                             
                  or the functions recited as part of a means-plus-function.  Similarly, claim 30                             

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