Appeal 2007-0325
Application 09/780,248
1 bidders make bids very close to the end of the auction, the
2 auction is automatically extended by a predetermined amount of
3 time. This prevents what is commonly referred to as "sniping,"
4 e.g., waiting until moments before the auction closes to place a
5 small incremental winning bid and preventing competing bids
6 to be entered (the auction ends before competitors can place a
7 bid). [Holden, Paragraph [0083].]
8 13. As the Appellant indicates, the bids are treated the same in Holden.
9 The only difference is that the auction is extended. This does not in any
10 way treat the bids less favorably. The bids are treated precisely the same
11 way during the auction extension that they are before the auction
12 extension (Br. 8).
13 14. Shoham shows defining rules for actions in an auction in its
14 description of a Market Specification Console (Shoham, col. 5, l. 65 to
15 col. 9, l. 27), said rules including at least a time when the action will take
16 place, and an actual action that will take place at the defined time
17 (Shoham, Table 2, col. 7-8).
18 15. Claim 5 and the claims that depend from it contain the limitation of
19 “keeping the rules secret until the defined time.” These claims do not
20 recite from whom the claims are to be kept secret.
21 16. Shoham recites an exemplary rule of “If trader A modifies a bid by
22 more than Z% then close access to the market for trader A and
23 investigate for gaming behavior” (Shoham, col. 8, ll. 15-19).
24 17. A person of ordinary skill in the art would know that rules to reduce
25 gaming behavior are generally kept secret because general knowledge of
26 the rules would enable gaming behavior just insufficient to trigger the
27 rules. Thus, Shoham suggests the types of rules that would be kept
10
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Last modified: September 9, 2013