Appeal 2007-0816
Application 11/095,887
2. ANTICIPATION
Claims 1 and 3 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated
by Woody1 (Answer 3).
The Examiner cites Woody as describing
a car seat having a seat shell 5,7 (Fig. 2) with a seating surface
and a seat belt 45 (see Fig. 6) releasably secured to the shell by
a release button 48 on the seating surface, a transponder (see
column 2, lines 1-8) that remotely activates the release button to
release the seat belt from the shell, and a transreceiver 21 (Fig.
3) associated with the release button.
(Final Rejection 2.)
Appellant argues that Woody does not teach the “seat belt” required in
claim 1 (Br. 6;2 Reply Br. 43). “Instead Woody teaches a wrist
restraint” (Br. 6).
The Examiner urges that by giving the terms “seat” and “belt” their
broadest reasonable interpretations, it is reasonable to interpret the term
“seat belt as a strip of flexible material on a chair, stool, or bench to be sat
on. Therefore, Woody teaches a seat belt, as recited in claim [1], because
the restraints 40,45 are strips of flexible material located on the chair sat on
by the user” (Answer 6).
“Although the PTO must give claims their broadest reasonable
interpretation, this interpretation must be consistent with the one that those
skilled in the art would reach.” In re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353, 1358,
1 Woody, US 4,813,745, Mar. 21, 1989.
2 Supplemental Appeal Brief received June 15, 2006.
3 Reply Brief received September 8, 2006.
3
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