Appeal 2007-0875
Application 10/774,692
During proceedings before the Examiner, the claims are given their broadest
reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification as it would have
been understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. See In re Morris,
127 F.3d 1048, 1054, 44 USPQ2d 1023, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1997); and In re
Graves, 69 F.3d 1147, 1152, 36 USPQ2d 1697, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The
specification is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis.
Usually, it is dispositive since it is the single best guide to the meaning of a
disputed term. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316, 75
USPQ2d 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Even when obviousness is
based on a single prior art reference, there must be a showing of a
suggestion, reason, or motivation to modify the teachings of that reference.
See In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 1370, 55 USPQ2d 1313, 1316-17 (Fed.
Cir. 2000). A reference must be considered not only for what it expressly
teaches but also for what it fairly suggests. All disclosures of the prior art,
including unpreferred embodiments, must be considered in determining
obviousness. See In re Burckel, 592 F.2d 1175, 1179, 201 USPQ 67, 70
(CCPA 1979); and In re Lamberti, 545 F.2d 747, 750, 192 USPQ 278, 280
(CCPA 1976).
Applying the preceding legal principles to the factual findings on the
record in this appeal, we determine that the Examiner has established a
prima facie case of obviousness based on the reference evidence, when the
claim language is properly construed. We further determine that Appellants’
arguments do not adequately rebut this prima facie case.
We first construe the scope and meaning of the contested term
“toasting” (see claim 11 on appeal). Appellants specifically define “toasted”
to mean that “a bread slice is heated until browned by a heating system. A
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