Appeal 2007-0981
Application 10/803,434
skilled artisan would have recognized and appreciated that any requirement
for user access request from a central clearinghouse would defeat the
purpose of preprogramming access authorization into the remote access lock
control.
We make further reference to an additional embodiment of Kniffin which
buttresses the view that different embodiments and variations thereof
disclosed by Kniffin describe situations in which access information is
programmed into the lock control and a user need not contact a central
clearinghouse for access. In a variation of the cellular telephone
embodiment described beginning at column 7, line 17 of Kniffin, a user
utilizes a cellular telephone to transmit RF signals to a lock control system,
which checks to see if the user is on a programmed list of authorized users,
to gain access to a locked door without transmitting to a clearinghouse.
(Kniffin, col. 7, ll. 36-37 and 44-49).
In view of the above discussion and analysis of the disclosure of Kniffin,
we find that, although the Examiner’s stated rejection included a reliance on
Pinzon to provide a teaching of preprogramming access control information
into a lock system independent of a user request for access, this teaching is
cumulative to what is already disclosed by Kniffin. Accordingly, it is our
opinion that, although we found no error in the Examiner’s proposed
combination of Kniffin and Pinzon as discussed supra, the Pinzon reference
is not necessary for a proper rejection of independent claim 1 since all of the
claimed elements are in fact present in the disclosure of Kniffin.
For the above reasons, since it is our opinion that the Examiner has
established a prima facie case of obviousness which has not been overcome
by any convincing arguments from Appellants, the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C.
7
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