Appeal 2007-1066
Application 10/170,510
reference may anticipate claim 1, we note that the claim would also be
obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103. A claim that is anticipated by a reference is
also obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103, since “anticipation is the epitome of
obviousness.” See, e.g., Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542,
1548, 220 USPQ 193, 198 (Fed. Cir. 1983); In re Fracalossi, 681 F.2d 792,
794, 215 USPQ 569, 571 (CCPA 1982); In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399,
1402, 181 USPQ 641, 644 (CCPA 1974).
We are therefore not persuaded of error in the rejection of instant
claim 1. We sustain the rejection of claim 1, and of claims 8 and 15 grouped
with the claim.
The remainder of Appellants’ remarks, apart from repeating language
from the claims, rely on the limitations of claim 1 that we have considered.
Although claims are placed in separate headings, the remarks under the
headings are not arguments for separately patentability of the respective
claims. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii). Even if assumed to constitute
arguments for separate patentability, the remarks fail to show error in the
Examiner’s rejection.
Appellants submit, however, that page 14 of the Brief provides
separate arguments for representative, dependent claim 7. (Reply Br. 4.)
However, even were we to assume that, as alleged, Su does not teach a
machine or module that allows a user to provide “explicit” error correction,
Potamianos does (e.g., § 4.1, “explicit confirmation” of a value, thus
discarding erroneous values). We therefore disagree with Appellants (Br.
14) that the cited combination of Su, Reed, and Potamianos does not
6
Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Next
Last modified: September 9, 2013