Appeal 2007-1089 Application 10/348,277 matter.”7 Id. at 295, 30 USPQ2d at 1459. In sum, the Federal Circuit has never ruled that methods without any transformation are eligible, and appears in Schrader to have rejected that proposition. We believe that “process” should not be broadened so as to include any and every method that may be deemed useful. The Supreme Court’s and Federal Circuit’s articulated eligibility tests keep the interpretation of “process” in pari materia with the other three categories of inventions – manufacture, machine, and composition of matter. In other words, interpreting “process” as either transforming subject matter or implemented by one of the other three categories of inventions is rationally consistent 7 Although the FWA test is no longer considered particularly probative in the context of computer-implemented process inventions in view of Diehr (see, e.g., State Street, 149 F.3d at 1374, 47 USPQ2d at 1601 ), the erosion of FWA provides no support for the position that a non-machine implemented process, not involving any transformation, might be patentable. The answer to that question is still provided by Schrader, and that answer, so far, is negative. While AT&T indicated that Schrader is “unhelpful” because it did not reach the question whether a “useful, concrete, and tangible result” occurred, the reason that case did not need to reach that question was because it found that Schrader’s method claims were unpatentable for lack of any transformation. In addition, Schrader’s claims did not require machine-implementation, unlike AT&T’s claims. See AT&T, 172 F.3d at 1358, 50 USPQ2d at 1452 (“AT&T’s claimed process” uses “switching and recording mechanisms to create a signal useful for billing purposes.”). Moreover, it is axiomatic that dicta in one Federal Circuit panel decision cannot overrule the holding of an earlier panel decision. George E. Warren Corp. v. United States, 341 F.3d 1348, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“We cannot simply overrule [a prior panel] decision, even if we were persuaded . . . that it is appropriate; to overrule a precedent, the court must rule en banc” (citing Newell Cos. v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757, 765, 9 USPQ2d 1417, 1423 (Fed.Cir.1988)). 31Page: Previous 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 Next
Last modified: September 9, 2013