Ex Parte Glenner et al - Page 31


               Appeal 2007-1089                                                                             
               Application 10/348,277                                                                       
               matter.”7  Id. at 295, 30 USPQ2d at 1459.  In sum, the Federal Circuit has                   
               never ruled that methods without any transformation are eligible, and                        
               appears in Schrader to have rejected that proposition.                                       
                      We believe that “process” should not be broadened so as to include                    
               any and every method that may be deemed useful.  The Supreme Court’s                         
               and Federal Circuit’s articulated eligibility tests keep the interpretation of               
               “process” in pari materia with the other three categories of inventions –                    
               manufacture, machine, and composition of matter.  In other words,                            
               interpreting “process” as either transforming subject matter or implemented                  
               by one of the other three categories of inventions is rationally consistent                  
                                                                                                           
               7 Although the FWA test is no longer considered particularly probative                       
               in the context of computer-implemented process inventions in view of Diehr                   
               (see, e.g., State Street, 149 F.3d at 1374, 47 USPQ2d at 1601 ), the erosion                 
               of FWA provides no support for the position that a non-machine                               
               implemented process, not involving any transformation, might be patentable.                  
               The answer to that question is still provided by Schrader, and that answer, so               
               far, is negative.  While AT&T indicated that Schrader is “unhelpful” because                 
               it did not reach the question whether a “useful, concrete, and tangible result”              
               occurred, the reason that case did not need to reach that question was                       
               because it found that Schrader’s method claims were unpatentable for lack                    
               of any transformation.  In addition, Schrader’s claims did not require                       
               machine-implementation, unlike AT&T’s claims.  See AT&T, 172 F.3d at                         
               1358, 50 USPQ2d at 1452 (“AT&T’s claimed process” uses “switching and                        
               recording mechanisms to create a signal useful for billing purposes.”).                      
               Moreover, it is axiomatic that dicta in one Federal Circuit panel decision                   
               cannot overrule the holding of an earlier panel decision.  George E. Warren                  
               Corp. v. United States, 341 F.3d 1348, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“We cannot                     
               simply overrule [a prior panel] decision, even if we were persuaded . . . that               
               it is appropriate; to overrule a precedent, the court must rule en banc” (citing             
               Newell Cos. v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757, 765, 9 USPQ2d 1417, 1423                       
               (Fed.Cir.1988)).                                                                             

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