Appeal 2007-1089
Application 10/348,277
embedding is a computer, a human, or something else. Accordingly, the
claim is so broad that it is directed to the abstract idea itself, rather than a
practical implementation of the concept. In addition, the claims are “so
abstract and sweeping” that they would “wholly pre-empt” all applications
(whether performed by a machine or a human) that are directed to the steps
of receiving, identifying, combining, and embedding media objects and
associated metadata. See Benson, 409 U.S. at 68-72, 175 USPQ at 675-677;
see also Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544, 31 USPQ2d at 1558 (quoting Benson).
Indeed, we note that the claimed “media objects” are broadly defined
in Appellants’ Specification as referring to, inter alia, “pictures” as well as
“photographs” (Specification 7, ¶ 3). Thus, we find the sweeping breadth of
independent claim 23 would, for example, preempt human artists from
creating derivative works by editing media objects (e.g., picture(s)) by
receiving a plurality of media objects (pictures), identifying the metadata
(e.g., the name of the work or artist) to generate a new media object (i.e., a
derivative work) by combining a subset of media objects (pictures) to
generate a new media object (derivative work) such that a first media object
(picture) is embedded into a second media object (picture).10
10 See Title 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A ‘derivative work’ is a work based upon one
or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement,
dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art
reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work
may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial
revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a
whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a ‘derivative work.’”).
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