Appeal 2007-1695
Application 10/418,835
However, with respect to independent claim 6, we do not agree with
Appellants’ assertion that the processing of “various information” and the
subsequent “visualization” of the processed information is a tangible result
(see Br. 19). Appellants contend that the recited “visualization” is concrete
and tangible because it results in the physical display of information (id.).
We disagree. We find no step of displaying information positively recited in
claim 6. Indeed, no “physical display” of information is claimed (claim 6).
Thus, we find the scope of the claimed “visualization” broadly but
reasonably encompasses a mental construct and/or an abstract idea (e.g.,
“visualization” within one’s mind). In addition, we note that claim 6 fails to
recite a computer for performing the steps of the method. While claim 6
does recite a database, we find that the scope of the term “database” may
broadly encompass a database of “information” in the abstract. If the “acts”
of a claimed process manipulate only numbers, abstract concepts or ideas, or
signals representing any of the foregoing, the acts are not being applied to
appropriate subject matter. In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 294-95, 30
USPQ2d 1455, 1458-59 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
In contrast, “when a claim containing [an abstract idea] implements or
applies that [idea] in a structure or process which, when considered as a
whole, is performing a function which the patent laws were designed to
protect (e.g., transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing),
then the claim satisfies the requirements of § 101.” Diamond v. Diehr, 450
U.S. 175, 192, 209 USPQ 1, 10 (1981); see also Gottschalk v. Benson, 409
U.S. 63, 70, 175 USPQ 673, 676 (1972) (“Transformation and reduction of
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