Appeal 2007-2096
Application 10/611,765
ordinary skill in this art would have employed a likeness of a pig instead of a
dolphin.
Accordingly, we are of the opinion that one of ordinary skill in this art
armed with the knowledge in the art, routinely following the combined
teachings of Buj, Strandberg, Frucher, and Brenkus would have reasonably
arrived at the claimed dinnerware article encompassed by claims 1 and 16,
including all of the limitations thereof arranged as required therein, without
resort to the disclosure in Appellant’s Specification. See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co.
v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741, 82 USPQ2d 1385, 1389 (2007)
(analysis supporting obviousness should “identify a reason that would have
prompted a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine the elements” in
the manner claimed); In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 985-88, 78 USPQ2d 1329,
1334-337 (Fed. Cir. 2006); In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425, 208 USPQ 871,
881 (CCPA 1981) (“the test [for obviousness] is what the combined
teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill
in the art”).
Accordingly, based on our consideration of the totality of the record
before us, we have weighed the evidence of obviousness found in the
combined teachings of Buj, Strandberg, Frucher, and Brenkus with
Appellant’s countervailing evidence of and argument for nonobviousness
and conclude that the claimed invention encompassed by appealed claims
1 through 5, 7, 10 through 13, and 16, 19, and 20 would have been obvious
as a matter of law under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
We cannot reach the same conclusion with respect to the ground of
rejection of claims 17 and 18. Like Appellant, we determine Gruneisen III
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