Appeal No. 2007-3253
Application 10/733,414
the claim terms their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the
written description provided in Appellant’s Specification as it would be
interpreted by one of ordinary skill in this art. See In re Morris, 127 F.3d
1048, 1054-55, 44 USPQ2d 1023, 1027-28 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[T]he PTO
applies to the verbiage of the proposed claims the broadest reasonable
meaning of the words in their ordinary usage as they would be understood
by one of ordinary skill in the art, taking into account whatever
enlightenment by way of definitions or otherwise that may be afforded by
the written description contained in the applicant’s specification.”); In re
Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1192-95, 29 USPQ2d 1845, 1848-50 (Fed.
Cir. 1994) (en banc) (“[T]he ‘broadest reasonable interpretation’ that an
examiner may give means-plus-function language is that statutorily
mandated in [35 U.S.C. § 112,] paragraph six.”); In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319,
321-22, 13 USPQ2d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“During patent
examination the pending claims must be interpreted as broadly as their terms
reasonably allow. When the applicant states the meaning that the claim
terms are intended to have, the claims are examined with that meaning, in
order to achieve a complete exploration of the applicant’s invention and its
relation to the prior art.”) (citing In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404-05, 162
USPQ 541, 550-51 (CCPA 1969)).
In view of the “means” recitations, the claims must be interpreted with
respect to whether any or all of the “means” limitations specify a function
without defining structure sufficient to satisfy that function. If any or all of
the “means” limitations specify only a function and not the structure for
satisfying that function, the strictures of 35 U. S. C. § 112, sixth paragraph,
apply to the limitation(s). See Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc.,
4
Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Next
Last modified: September 9, 2013