Hughes A. and Marilyn B. Bagley - Page 13

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                  Where there is an express allocation contained in the agreement between               
            the parties, it will generally be followed in determining the allocation if                 
            the agreement is entered into by the parties in an adversarial context at                   
            arm's length and in good faith.  Robinson v. Commissioner, supra.  However, an              
            express allocation set forth in the settlement is not necessarily                           
            determinative if other facts indicate that the payment was intended by the                  
            parties to be for a different purpose.                                                      
                  It is petitioners' position that the express language in the settlement               
            agreement provides that the payment is a payment for the actual injuries.  In               
            support of this position petitioners quote the provision of the agreement that              
            petitioner acknowledges payment and receipt of the sum of $1.5 million as                   
            damages "for personal injuries, including alleged damages for invasion of                   
            privacy, injury to personal reputation including defamation, emotional stress,              
            and pain and suffering".  It is petitioners' contention that this express                   
            language in the settlement shows that the entire payment of $1.5 million was                
            made for a tort type personal injury and, therefore, is excludable under                    
            section 104(a)(2).  In support of this position, petitioners cite the                       
            statement in Glynn v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 116, 120 (1981), affd. without                  
            published opinion 676 F.2d 683 (1st Cir. 1982), that the most important fact                
            in determining the purpose of the payment is "express language [in the                      
            agreement] stating that the payment was made on account of personal injuries".              
            See also Metzger v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 834, 847 (1987), affd. without                    
            published opinion 845 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1988).  Petitioners state that the                 
            situation in petitioner's case is almost identical with that in McKay v.                    
            Commissioner, supra, and is distinguishable from the situation in Robinson v.               
            Commissioner, supra, relied on by respondent.                                               
                  In both Robinson v. Commissioner, supra at 127, and McKay v.                          
            Commissioner, supra at 483, we recognized that when a settlement agreement                  
            clearly allocates the settlement proceeds between tortlike personal injury                  





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