Hughes A. and Marilyn B. Bagley - Page 19

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            compensatory to the injured party, whereas under Kentucky law punitive damages              
            served both to compensate the injured party and punish the wrongdoer.                       
            Therefore, even though we held we would follow our position in the Miller                   
            case, we also distinguished the Miller case from Horton v. Commissioner,                    
            supra, on the basis of the difference in Kentucky and Maryland law.                         
                  The four circuits, in addition to the Fourth Circuit in Miller and the                
            Sixth Circuit in Horton, which have addressed the deductibility of punitive                 
            damages have come to the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals for the                 
            Fourth Circuit in Miller that damages which are compensatory in nature are                  
            excludable, but damages which are noncompensatory in nature are not excludable              
            under section 104(a)(2).  The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that              
            punitive damages were not excludable from gross income where the punitive                   
            award was not a restoration of lost capital and was "'not intended to                       
            compensate the injured party, but rather to punish the tort-feasor whose                    
            wrongful action was intentional or malicious, and to deter him and others from              
            similar extreme conduct.'"  (Hawkins v. United States, 30 F.3d 1077, 1083 (9th              
            Cir. 1994), citing City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 266                
            (1981)).  The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit further found that                     
            punitive damages were not awarded to a taxpayer "on account of" personal                    
            injury, but rather were awarded "on account of" the tortfeasor's deplorable                 
            conduct.  Hawkins v. United States, supra at 1080.                                          
                  In Reese v. United States, 24 F.3d 228 (Fed. Cir. 1994), the court found              
            that punitive damages received by a taxpayer in an action under the District                
            of Columbia Human Rights Act were not excludable since they were in the nature              
            of noncompensatory damages.  The Federal Circuit, relying on a District of                  
            Columbia case as well as the Supreme Court's language in City of Newport v.                 
            Fact Concerts, Inc., supra, and similar cases, and on the legislative history               
            of section 104(a)(2), stated that "it would be inconsistent with the                        
            legislative history to treat punitive damages as excludable from income, since              





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