Hughes A. and Marilyn B. Bagley - Page 24

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            "beginning and end" of the analysis.  Under the holding in the Schleier case,               
            once it is determined that the nature of the claim is based on a "tort or tort              
            type right", it is necessary to further determine whether the amounts received              
            were "on account of personal injuries or sickness."                                         
                  The Supreme Court has made it clear in the Schleier case that damages                 
            which are not compensatory but punitive in nature are not excludable from                   
            gross income under section 104(a)(2).  The Supreme Court stated:                            
                        We agree with * * * [the taxpayer] that if Congress had                         
                  intended the ADEA's liquidated damages to compensate plaintiffs                       
                  for personal injuries, those damages might well come within                           
                  section 104(a)(2)'s exclusion.  There are, however, two weaknesses                    
                  in                                                                                    
                  * * * [the taxpayer's] argument.  First, even if we assume that                       
                  Congress was aware of the Court's observation in Overnight Motor                      
                  that the liquidated damages authorized by the FLSA might provide                      
                  compensation for some "obscure" injuries, it does not necessarily                     
                  follow that Congress would have understood that observation as                        
                  referring to injuries that were personal rather than economic.                        
                  Second, and more importantly, we have previously rejected  * * *                      
                  [the taxpayer's] argument:  We have already concluded that the                        
                  liquidated damages provisions of the ADEA were a significant                          
                  departure from those in the FLSA, see Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S.                     
                  at 581, 98 S.Ct., at 870; Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston,                     
                  469 U.S. at 126, 105 S.Ct., at 624, and we explicitly held in                         
                  Thurston:  "Congress intended for liquidated damages to be                            
                  punitive in nature." Id., at 125, 105 S.Ct., at 624.                                  
                        Our holding in Thurston disposes of * * * [the taxpayer's]                      
                  argument and requires the conclusion that liquidated damages under                    
                  the ADEA, like back wages under the ADEA, are not received "on                        
                  account of personal injury or sickness." [Fn. refs. omitted]                          
            Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S.    , 115 S.Ct. at 2165.                                  
                  It is clear from this paragraph that if punitive damages are not of a                 
            compensatory nature, they are not excludable under section 104(a)(2).  The                  
            Supreme Court in the Schleier case left open when punitive or exemplary                     
            damages under a particular Federal or State law are intended to be                          
            compensatory.  We, therefore, look to the State law to determine whether the                
            punitive damages petitioner received were compensatory in nature.                           
                  The present case involves Iowa law.  See Bagley v. Iowa Beef Processors,              
            Inc., 797 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1985).  Under Iowa law, it is clear that punitive              
            damages are to punish the person who is liable for injury and set an example                




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