benefit, which transcends "normal" support. During her
husband's incarceration, petitioner worked only during the
years 1989 and 1990. No other evidence is provided to show
a source of financial support for the balance of the time.
Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that there was no
nexus between the tax understatements or the items
underlying the understatements and Mr. DiMichele's $40,000
cash gift.
As to petitioner's argument that her "middle class"
lifestyle did not change and was not lavish, this is not
the focus of the inquiry. As stated previously, present
consumption is not required in determining whether a
taxpayer has significantly benefitted from a tax
understatement. Moreover, petitioner would have had to
present specific documented patterns of spending to show
that there had been no change in order to meet her burden.
See Estate of Krock, supra at 679-680.
The policy behind this rule is set forth in the recent
case of Purificato, where the court writes:
Furthermore, we cannot believe that Congress, in
enacting sec. 6013(e)(1)(D), intended to require
the kind of investigations and trials that would
be needed if entitlement to "innocent spouse"
relief depended on facts and circumstances of
this type. For example, we do not think that
Congress wanted to require the IRS to investigate
whether the Purificato couples ever went out to
dinner, to the movies, or to a ballgame. Nor do
we think that Congress wanted to require the tax
court to conduct a trial and make findings on
such questions. Purificato, supra at 296.
A taxpayer derives a benefit from the use of ill-
gotten funds even if they are unaware that the funds are
tainted. Turner v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1988-339.
Thus, the element of knowledge does not enter the inquiry
into whether petitioner significantly benefitted from the
tax under-statements.
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