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under 11 U.S.C. section 362(a)(8) (1988), from filing a petition with this
Court at that time. On November 1, 1994, however, the bankruptcy court
entered its order granting Pacific's motion for summary judgment and
determined that all of petitioners' debts were nondischargeable under 11
U.S.C. section 727 (1988). On January 23, 1995, the bankruptcy court entered
an order granting petitioners' motion for relief and vacating its order
entered November 1, 1994. It is under these circumstances that we decide
whether the petition filed with this Court on December 12, 1994, was filed in
violation of the automatic stay.
Petitioners argue that the bankruptcy court's order of
nondischargeability, entered November 1, 1994, served to deny them a
discharge, and, therefore, terminated the automatic stay. But, petitioners
maintain that the bankruptcy court's order entered January 23, 1995, vacating
its order of November 1, 1994, had the effect of reinstating the automatic
stay as of that date.
Respondent concurs with the proposition that the order of
nondischargeability had the effect of terminating the automatic stay.
Respondent, however, disagrees with petitioners' contention that the
bankruptcy court's order entered January 23, 1995, reinstated the automatic
stay. In respondent's view the automatic stay is terminated by the judgment
of nondischargeability and, absent express language in the bankruptcy court's
vacating order to the contrary, the stay is not reinstated.
The Automatic Stay
While the parties agree that the automatic stay was lifted by the order
of nondischargeability, they disagree as to the effect of the order, entered
approximately 3 months later, that vacated that order. There are, as we view
the issue, three possible results. First, when a judgment described in 11
U.S.C. section 362(c) (1988), is vacated the stay is deemed to have been in
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