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adviser's expertise (in this case accounting and tax advice), but
it is not reasonable or prudent to rely upon a tax adviser
regarding matters outside of his field of expertise or with
respect to facts that he does not verify. See David v.
Commissioner, 43 F.3d at 789-790; Goldman v. Commissioner, 39
F.3d at 408; Skeen v. Commissioner, 864 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1989),
affg. Patin v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1086 (1987); Lax v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-329; Sacks v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1994-217; Prohaska v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1991-306;
Prohaska v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1991-305; Rogers v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-619; see also Jaroff v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-527; Gollin v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1996-454; Grelsamer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-399;
Zenkel v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-398; Estate of Busch v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-342; Spears v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1996-341, with respect to Becker's advice in Plastics
Recycling cases.
Petitioner's reliance on Heasley v. Commissioner, 902 F.2d
380 (5th Cir. 1990), revg. T.C. Memo. 1988-408; Reile v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-488; Davis v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1989-607, is misplaced. In each of those cases, the Court
declined to sustain the negligence additions to tax in part
because the taxpayers relied upon a professional adviser. The
facts of the instant case, however, are distinctly different from
the facts of those cases.
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