- 16 -
Meredith Corp. v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 406, 438 (1994); Estate
of Durkin v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 561, 572-573 (1992), supple-
menting T.C. Memo. 1992-325; Elrod v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1046,
1065-1066 (1986); Peterson Machine Tool, Inc. v. Commissioner, 79
T.C. 72, 81-82 (1982), affd. 54 AFTR 2d 84-5407, 84-2 USTC par.
9885 (10th Cir. 1984). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed our use of the strong proof rule in Schulz v.
Commissioner, 294 F.2d 52, 55 (9th Cir. 1961), affg. 34 T.C. 235
(1960). See also Salyer Grain & Milling Co. v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1986-165, affd. without opinion 815 F.2d 1265 (9th
Cir. 1987).
Petitioners have failed to present strong proof that CPC,
and not petitioner in his individual capacity, was obligated by
the covenant not to compete contained in section 7 of the pur-
chase contract. We are unwilling to accept the testimony of
petitioner and his son as strong proof that they did not intend
that section to mean what it says or that they did not intend to
allocate $76,000 of the total purchase price that his son was to
pay under the purchase contract to the "Covenant Not to Compete
8(...continued)
1390 (9th Cir. 1977), remanding T.C. Memo. 1973-223; see Baxter
v. Commissioner, 433 F.2d 757, 759 (9th Cir. 1970), affg. T.C.
Memo. 1969-87. Regardless whether we were to apply the standard
set forth in the Palo Alto Town & Country Village case, the
strong proof rule that we generally apply, the Danielson rule, or
even a preponderance of the evidence standard, our holding herein
would remain the same.
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